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Chapter

Electronic Purchasing Consortia: A Future Procurement
Direction?
Bernd Huber, Edward Sweeney, Austin Smyth

SUMMARY. In literature, there has been little empirical research
investigation on purchasing consortium issues focusing on a detailed
analysis of information and communication technology (ICT) based
procurement strategies. Electronic purchasing consortia (EPC) enable
purchasing organisations, to varying degrees, to electronically conduct
tasks that are necessary for the management of demand aggregation of two
or more legal entities, provide efficient ICT-based communication
infrastructures and rely more on electronic communication than face-toface contact. Therefore, there is a need to relate the term EPC to academic
literature and thus empower clearer analysis, which is addressed at
academics and purchasing professionals alike. Based on the empirical
evidence of case studies and a survey among e-Marketplaces / procurement
service providers (PSPs) in the automotive and electronics industry sectors,
an overall statement is proposed: Effective participation in electronic
purchasing consortia can have the potential to enhance competitive
advantage. Implementation therefore requires a clear and detailed
understanding of the major process structures and drivers at the eMarketplace / PSP level of analysis.

1. Introduction
Both academics and practitioners have become very innovative in
developing new strategic procurement concepts (such as early supplier
involvement) in order to administer buyer-supplier relationships more
effectively (van Weele, 2000). One of the main reasons is the concentration
on core competencies at the company level, which led to a significant
increase of sourcing activities. In the literature however, there has been little
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empirical research investigation on purchasing consortium issues focusing
on a detailed analysis of ICT-based procurement strategies.
According to Hendrick (1997), a purchasing consortium is “a formal or
informal arrangement, where two or more organisations, who are separate
legal entities, collaborate among themselves, or through a third party, to
combine their individual needs for products from suppliers and to gain the
increased pricing, quality, and service advantages associated with volume
buying”. Arnold (1996) specifies some constitutional features for cooperation in general: “Independence of co-operation members is a criteria
used by law to distinguish co-operation from merger. That causes tensions
between autonomy and dependence. The membership in a co-operation is
voluntary; nobody should be forced to participate. The main interest of the
co-operation is an ex ante matching of plans or co-ordination of single
interest, normally in a company’s function like purchasing etc. The main
goal of a co-operation is to reach better economical results for all cooperation partners.”
Essig (1999) notes that a purchasing consortium may be just one, but an
important element of a supply strategy and may be combined with other
effective sourcing strategies such as global sourcing, single sourcing, system
sourcing, and other strategies. The selection of available sourcing concepts
characterises the supply strategy (see Figure 1). Pooled purchasing is a
strategic task of purchasing management that should be firmly rooted in the
purchasing processes, procedures and policies of a corporation (Essig,
2000). However, academic research in purchasing consortia overall and in
particular in EPC is therefore quite limited because purchasing consortia
have traditionally not been very well adopted within industry. Conceptual
and empirical articles are scarce. Few researchers have analysed purchasing
consortia: For example, Essig (2000) examined research in purchasing
consortia both in the Anglo-Saxon countries and in Germany, whereas
Hendrick (1997) has analysed a blueprint for the formation of purchasing
consortia by survey research among the Fortune 500 in the United States.
With the advent of ICT such as the Internet, there may be better entry
options for the formation and management of purchasing consortia to
enhance their effectiveness and efficiency level. Electronic purchasing
consortia (EPC) enable purchasing organisations, to varying degrees, to
electronically conduct tasks that are necessary for the management of
demand aggregation of two or more legal entities, provide efficient ICT-
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based communication infrastructures and rely more on electronic
communication than face-to-face contact.
Figure 1

The Sourcing Toolbox

Sub-strategy
Supplier SubStrategy
Object Substrategy

Sourcing Concepts
Sole Sourcing

Single
Sourcing

Unit Sourcing

Dual Sourcing

Multiple
Sourcing

Modular Sourcing

Area Sub-Strategy

Local Sourcing

Domestic Sourcing

Time Sub-Strategy

Stock Sourcing

Demand Tailored
Sourcing

Global Sourcing
Just-in-Time

Site Sub-Strategy

External Sourcing

Internal Sourcing (Factory
within a Factory-Approach)

Subject SubStrategy

Individual Sourcing

Consortium Approach

Source: Essig (2000)

While aforementioned researchers do not discuss ICT in relation to
purchasing in any great detail, Quayle (2002) surveyed SMEs to comment
on the feasibility and desirability of a purchasing consortium using eCommerce. There was a mixed reaction to the concept. Some 70% of
respondents thought that such a consortium was desirable but 60% of those
considered that it might not be feasible. That as one of the reasons why
Quayle recommended that research is required to investigate the operational
characteristics and constraints of such consortia.
Moreover, Corsten and Zagler (1999) describe various tasks required for
EPC management. They report about an action research project on
purchasing consortia and Internet technologies. The starting consortium
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consisted of seven industry partners, predominantly from the machining
industry in the Lake Constance area. The intention was to develop an
Internet platform where SMEs can exchange knowledge, pool demand and
attract suppliers. However, their study did not include important research
issues such as the empirical level of EPC adoption with regard to industry
sectors’ structures and anti-trust limitations, a categorisation of EPC
management structures and scope, revenue models, etc. that are explained
and elaborated on in more detail in the following. The lack of studies that
focus on ICT-supported purchasing consortia provide room for
improvement in both managerial and academic research.

2. Theory Background
Pooled sourcing strategies are not a new concept. However, they have
been mainly evolving in the public sector, where co-operative purchasing
has been practised in non-profit institutions (e.g. universities). Therefore,
when exploring the most relevant approaches to pooled sourcing in
literature in general, co-operative purchasing models in the public sector are
primarily analysed (e.g. Housley, 1983). However, co-operative purchasing
is but one of the entire global pooled procurement strategy terms. Due to the
concentration on core competencies, the trend of industrial enterprises
towards the formation of strategic demand aggregation alliances started
mainly in the last two decades and is described as consortium purchasing
(Essig, 1999). According to Major (1997), a purchasing consortium is an
offshoot of the more traditional buying group, the co-operative. Harland
(2002) confirms that it was not until the 1990s that any substantive
empirical research of supply across inter-organisational networks was
undertaken.
However, the theoretical foundation for EPC is complex, going well
beyond the field of purchasing. As stated by Amit and Zott (2001), no single
strategic management theory can fully explain the value creation potential
of e-Business. They note that rather, an integration of the received
theoretical perspectives on value creation and a multi-perspective approach
is needed, as “(…) virtual markets broaden the notion of innovation as they
foster new forms of collaboration among firms (rather than merely new
products or production processes) and involve new exchange mechanisms
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and unique transaction methods”. An integration of strategic management
theories is required to situate EPC in literature.
The resource-based theory (e.g. Barney, 1991) and the positioning
stream (e.g. Porter, 1985) to competitive advantage have not addressed
issues where industrial firms have not as such developed critical resources
and capabilities but in co-operation with other firms. This theoretical
perspective suggests that competitive advantage can also be developed
through inter-firm co-operation and links. That is why the theory of strategic
networks and alliances (e.g. Gulati, 1998; Jarillo, 1988), which are based on
a continuum between market and hierarchy, is very relevant to EPC as a
further paradigm to competitive advantage.
According to Essig (1999), a purchasing consortium represents a hybrid
institution between market and hierarchy because partners combine their
purchasing power but still continue to exist as separate companies. Based on
the model of transaction cost and production cost theory, size and volume
obviously effect economies of scale and scope. Corsten and Zagler (1999)
state that electronic purchasing consortia may exploit synergetic potentials
of economies of scale and scope (e.g. Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988)
without the diseconomies of increased transaction and communication costs
(e.g. Williamson, 1975). Symbiosis is the driver and a prerequisite for
successful consortia (Essig, 1999). However, the effects are diminishing
with increased asset specificity. Synergy achieved from network
relationships can provide the foundation why electronic purchasing
consortia are formed. Rozemeijer (2000) argues that synergy is all the new
value that can be added through the organisation and the structure of
interrelationships between independent units.
However, EPC theory requires the integration of virtual structures in
strategic alliance networks and virtual organisations (e.g. Bakos and Treacy,
1986; Malone et al., 1987) as well as strategies in dis- or reintermediation
(e.g. Wigand and Benjamin, 1996) and in e-Procurement (e.g. Gebauer and
Zagler, 2000) to fully explain EPC. Traditionally, the lack of integration and
communication infrastructures was regarded as one of the biggest barriers
preventing the adoption and success of purchasing consortia. Electronic
purchasing consortia, as a network enabler, can potentially offer a more
efficient communication infrastructure with lower transaction costs (Corsten
and Zagler, 1999). Davenport and Short (1990) confirm that ICT systems
are one of the most powerful devices to shrink co-ordination costs in
network approaches. Metamediaries such as e-Marketplaces and
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procurement service providers can enable firms to adopt effective eProcurement systems. Replacing expensive EDI solutions governed by only
one buyer in a closed system, low entry costs, fast return on investment and
protection of existing EDI investment, recent developments in XMLprogramming, are all reasons for the transformation of the supply chain into
a network by Internet technologies (Richmond et al., 1998). According to
the US Federal Trade Commission (USFTC, 2000), “the aggregating power
of the Internet can overcome circumstances where otherwise the cost of
information gathering outweighs the value of the surplus”.
Therefore, the success of electronic purchasing consortia may be
impelled to a large degree by advances in ICT. However, van Weele (2000)
reports that most organisations lack an effective communications and
information infrastructure, which may organise, support and facilitate the
highly complex and often rapidly changing interfaces among the
organisational entities and disciplines involved in purchasing processes.
Therefore, the configuration and co-ordination necessary for e-Procurement
strategies have of late received an increasing amount of research attention.
Nontheless, Knudsen (2002) points out that there are still some uncertainties
as to how the overall performance of purchasing departments can be
improved by e-Procurement.
E-Procurement solutions and concepts are very diverse and have many
different meanings. de Boer et al., (2002) note in that respect that the
potential merit of various e-Procurement concepts, such as electronic
catalogue systems and software, electronic auctions, intelligent agent
applications, or electronic marketplaces, seems largely undisputed (e.g.
Croom, 2001; Smeltzer and Ruzicka, 2000). However, with regard to the
wide range of solutions available, many firms still struggle with assessing eProcurement suitability for their purchasing processes and mainly adopt a
‘wait and see’ approach. Moreover, there is no one best way to organise for
purchasing synergy and to improve inter-organisational demand aggregation
and purchasing co-ordination practices (Rozemeijer, 2000). A classification
and categorisation of EPC structures and drivers is missing in literature.

3. Research Methodology
Based on this background, an overall statement is assessed: Effective
participation in electronic purchasing consortia can have the potential to
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enhance competitive advantage. Implementation therefore requires a clear
and detailed understanding of the major process structures and drivers at the
e-Marketplace/ PSP level of analysis. The analysis of the overall statement
covers issues such as
– Industry sectors, anti-trust limitations and take-up of electronic
purchasing consortia.
– The level of awareness and importance of electronic purchasing
consortia and further customised services.
– Management structures, trading mechanisms and scope of EPC.
– Revenue models for electronic purchasing consortia.
– Level of benefits and drawbacks of electronic purchasing consortia.
– Critical factors in creating and managing electronic purchasing
consortia.
– Relationship between ROI and the use of electronic purchasing
consortia.
Five explorative case studies were conducted to obtain a first
understanding of a conceptual framework of EPC structures and process
drivers. The selection of cases was made to discover the whole variety of
EPC trading mechanisms. 29 focused interviews have been conducted, the
respondents of which were predominantly purchasing and IT managers.
Further information has also been collected from secondary sources (e.g.
internal reports, press releases). Figure 2 summarises the background of the
explorative case studies.
Figure 2
Case
1
2
3
4
5

Case Study Origin
Background
Consortium-led OEM e-Marketplace in automotive industry
Supplier-driven e-Marketplace in automotive industry
Regional multi-industry purchasing consortium
EPC software / procurement service provider in electronics industry
E-Marketplace / procurement service provider in MRO industry

However, case studies and other qualitative forms have long been
criticised for their limitations in terms of generalisability to a larger
population and the lack of sampling controls. Therefore, an online survey
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instrument for e-Marketplaces and procurement service providers was
additionally implemented and sent to 102 international active eMarketplaces and procurement service providers in the automotive,
electronics and closely related industries. Reasons for the choice of the
sectors derive from the background that both industries are pioneers and
advanced in supply chain management and e-Procurement. By choosing a
multi-method mix the disadvantageous effects of either approach may be
minimised, while taking advantage of the creative potential of qualitative
techniques as well as the analytics of quantitative techniques. The results of
the case studies and the survey are presented in the following.

4. Case Study Findings
Figure 3 shows a first classification and categorisation of EPC structures
and drivers derived from the case study findings in order to contrast
conditions that help to frame operational measures (McCutcheon and
Meredith, 1993). From the case research, it became clear that each EPC has
its own characteristics and distinguishing marks governed by e.g. sourcing
projects, industry sector, market position and buyer power, corporate
strategy or structure. However, a range of EPC structures (e.g. five EPC
trading mechanisms) and process drivers / enablers could be identified from
the case studies. There is a great variety in EPC approaches to achieve
purchasing synergy. Thus, the figure probably cannot provide a complete
picture, but a valuable starting point for further research on EPC.
While third-party intermediaries by definition per se do not cleanly fall
into the EPC continuum between markets and hierarchy, the case study
research found two categories of infomediaries that support EPC: The
laissez-faire model, where the e-Marketplace / PSP typically acts as a lead
source for purchasing organisations and suppliers and provides e.g. product
information, customisation, specifications or exchange mechanisms in order
to facilitate demand aggregation. In this way, the laissez-faire e-Marketplace
/ PSP itself plays a passive role in negotiating on behalf of either seller or
buyer, but provides the EPC infrastructure. The second mediated EPC
operating model is one where the e-Marketplace / PSP acts as an active
infomediary, which takes part in demand aggregation and negotiation
strategies on behalf of buyers or suppliers.
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Figure 3

Classification of Electronic Purchasing Consortia
EPC Structures:
Classification of EPC Co-operation:
(Informal ↔ Formal ↔ Outsourced)
 Laissez-faire Model

 Mediated Operating Level

Type of EPC Market Mechanisms and Negotiation Process:
EPC with eRFQ or
Reverse
Auction

Pre-Production
Buy-Cycle

Time-Limited
Buy-Cycle

Buy-Cycle
with Rebate
Scheme

Pre-Negotiated
Infomediation

EPC Industry Focus:
 Industry-wide (Vertical)
Focus

 Cross-Industry
(Horizontal) Focus

 Geographical Area

EPC Network Focus:
 Buy-side Focus
 Stable EPC Network

 Neutral

 Sell-side Focus
 Dynamic EPC Network

EPC Sourcing Approach:
 Spot Sourcing

 Systematic Sourcing

Type and Level of EPC Revenue Fees

9

Low

EPC Process Enablers and
Drivers:

High

 Pressures from Business Context
 Corporate Structure and Firm Size
 Co-opetition, Level of EPC Market Share (Buyer Power) and Anti-Trust Limitations

 Level of Support for EPC Product Standardisation Initiatives
(Homogeneity vs. Heterogeneity)
 EPC Sourcing Strategies, Purchasing Spend and Product Pooling / Synergy Potential

 Level of Distinctive Resources and Skills (Purchasing Maturity)

 Breadth of Customised Services and Enabling Technology
(Catalogue Systems, Intelligent Agents, Integration of ERP-Systems, etc.)
 Level of EPC Anonymity
Level of Additional Non-Electronic Support

 Tangible EPC Benefits (Economies of Scale / Scope vs. Transaction Costs)
Intangible EPC Benefits
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Another classification involves the type of EPC market mechanism and
negotiation processes. It was found from the case studies that several EPC
trading and aggregation models exist that can range from:
– EPC with electronic requests for quotation (e-RFQ) or reverse auctions.
– Pre-production demand aggregation price curves, i.e. multiple buyers
can electronically aggregate their orders around a supplier's pre-set and
pre-production shipping date at the expense of additional inventory costs
for purchasing organisations.
– Time limited buy-cycles, i.e. prices continually amend in pre-set
increments and time-frames as new group orders are electronically
placed.
– Buy-cycles with rebate schemes, i.e. an additional rebate is granted once
the total number of purchasers has been electronically finalised.
– Pre-negotiated infomediation, i.e. EPC providers pre-negotiate
purchasing prices based on aggregated demand and electronically link
buyers and suppliers, but do not take ownership of products.
The findings from the case studies suggest that the fit and compatibility
of the available EPC trading mechanisms and technology with
organisations’ existing procurement practices play an important role.
Overall, the presented EPC trading mechanisms are subject to a variety of
further process enablers and drivers and firms have to decide on structural
designs how EPC can be best integrated for particular sourcing projects. For
example, the case study findings confirmed Rozemeijer (2000) that these
structural designs can have a regional, national or global scope or can also
vary between co-operation that is voluntary, informal, and initiated bottomup, and co-operation that is mandatory, formal and initiated top-down by top
management. The structural designs can also include for example EPC
revenue fees, which can vary between a mixture of e.g. transaction fees,
fixed / monthly fees, initial licence fees or expenses paid on the basis of
achieved cost savings.
From the case studies it was also learnt that different EPC sourcing
approaches can prevail. Systematic sourcing typically involves long-term
buyer-supplier contracts and was strongly integrated into EPC with e-RFQ
and reverse auctions as well as pre-production buy-cycles. However,
information and communication technologies facilitate the initiation of EPC
spot sourcing and co-operation in dynamic alliance networks that can be
more short-term based and project-oriented. EPC therefore may range from
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long term institutionalised entities to ad-hoc agreements between
independent organisations. The case studies illustrated that dynamic EPC
predominantly concentrate on commodities with rather low asset specificity
and high product pooling potential. While stable networks may typically
benefit from the construction of mutual trust, repeated co-operation and
standardisation, dynamic EPC networks can temporarily integrate new
external partners during any new sourcing project. Dynamic EPC can call
on markets from an array of organisations to potentially respond more
efficiently and effectively to market sourcing opportunities and potentially
operate at lower cost than stable networks, but at the potential expense of
standardisation and trust building initiatives.
The level of anonymity between EPC partners is closely linked to the
distinction between stable and dynamic EPC. When search costs and the
advantages from long-term relationships are rather low, purchasers and
sellers may typically interact with virtual anonymity, as is the case in highly
liquid commodity markets. While EPC anonymity can potentially eliminate
inefficiencies in the markets where product homogeneity prevails, there
would be only limited opportunities for true anonymous EPC in the
automotive and electronics industry since a large part of the products are
rather complex and differentiated. In order to integrate a significant part of
purchasing volume into EPC and to aggregate heterogeneous products
among EPC members, it could be established from the case studies that
active commodity management, product customisation and standardisation
initiatives are required. A high level of collaboration between organisations
can also require additional semi-automatic or non-electronic support (e.g.
moderation services, face-to-face meetings).
Since the EPC partners would have no physical contact, some of the
qualities of face-to-face communication may not take effect. For instance,
Spar and Bussang (1996) confirm the absence of established rules on the
Internet, which according to their view leads to an uncertainty about the
possible behaviour of the business partner. Challenges (such as shared
understanding about EPC outcomes and how to achieve these outcomes or
the integration of procurement skills and knowledge across systems,
boundaries and cross-functional teams) are more salient in EPC with a high
level of virtuality. The case study findings suggest that integrated EPC
workflow processes should be able to support frequent formal and informal
interaction between members in order to realise purchasing synergy and
aggregate buyer power.
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From a buyer power anti-trust point of view, industry-led eMarketplaces / PSPs are noteworthy because they bring together powerful
groups of buyers. EPC that adopt an industry-wide (vertical) focus are
typically reviewed in terms of the traditional trade commissions’
competition rules. In the case studies, anti-trust limitations did not appear
for cross-industry (horizontal) EPC co-operation or for a geographical area.
Although the trade commissions provided general guidelines and
regulations on the treatment of consortium purchasing by competitors, they
have still not ruled exactly on this issue for e-Marketplaces / PSPs. The
legal conditions for EPC are still not fully clear and there is still some
uncertainty as to how exactly the prohibition on illicit sensitive information
exchange can and should operate with regard to EPC. Therefore, it can be
concluded that e-Marketplaces / PSPs with industry dominating players will
have to tread a fine line between procurement optimisation and restrictive
behaviours such as forming an EPC monopsony or oligopsony.
Another observation from the case studies is that pressures from the
business context seem (e.g. cost reduction) to drive firms to take advantage
of EPC potentials. Pressure to reduce costs was rather high in all cases. EPC
may be an initiative to deal with these business pressures and to realise
purchasing synergy in terms of tangible (e.g. net savings) or intangible
benefits (e.g. know-how transfer, benchmarking of best practice). The
multiple case studies highlighted different EPC trading mechanisms, process
enablers and drivers, which can be used to enable a better understanding of
the diversity of EPC approaches in practice. However, to add further
empirical results, the results of the survey among e-Marketplaces / PSPs are
presented in the following.

5. Survey Results
The survey instrument was a standardised questionnaire mainly
composed of multiple choice questions and numeric questions. Any effects
of personal bias were controlled to the degree that extensive pre-testing of
the survey instruments with practitioners and academics sought to identify
weaknesses in the make-up of questions or indeed identify omits.
This pre-tested questionnaire was originally electronically sent to 196
international active e-Marketplaces and procurement service providers in
the automotive, electronics and closely related industries. Due to a
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consolidation phase and decrease in the population of e-Marketplaces /
PSPs, 94 of them had terminated their operations and the population was
reduced to 102 e-Marketplaces / PSPs. The procedure to achieve a sufficient
response rate and to obtain non-respondents’ data was an integrative
process. First potential respondents were contacted four times during the
first response period by e-Mail. Next, non-respondents in the surveys were
contacted by phone and were interviewed on the level of current and future
EPC implementation. This process could provide the grounding for a nonrespondent analysis. 34 e-Marketplaces / PSPs were willing to provide data
to these two questions, but could not be motivated during the phone calls for
full survey participation. Non-respondents were finally contacted up to four
attempts by phone so that the full-survey coverage increased to a final
response rate of 42% (i.e. 43 responses). 24 e-Marketplaces / PSPs were not
at all interested in the research. This response rate can be considered as very
satisfactory in comparison to other survey research.
The non-response analysis from the 34 participants did not reveal any
significant differences and indicated that the pattern of responses was
reflective of the sample frame. Additionally, surveys were tested for
statistically significant differences in the responses of early and late returned
surveys. Again, no significant differences were found, suggesting that the
sample is representative for the population. The geographic distribution of
response shows that most participation came from Europe, followed by the
US. All e-Marketplaces and PSPs were operated for profit; non-profit
organisations did not participate in the survey.
Electronic purchasing consortia were offered by 19 of the total 43
participating e-Marketplaces and PSPs (44%). EPC are offered less in the
automotive industry (39%) than in the electronics industry (65%). EMarketplaces and PSPs that offer electronic purchasing consortia tend to be
buyer-centric. Overall, e-Marketplaces in general provide electronic
purchasing consortia only in limited cases. Only 27% of e-Marketplaces
offer EPC in comparison to 82% of PSPs. The findings suggest that eMarketplaces generally still have potential to develop and integrate EPC.
Currently, it was found that most e-Marketplaces concentrate on automating
purchasing and order replenishment processes, whereas PSPs focus more
closely on strategic procurement. PSPs take advantage of semi-automatic or
non-electronic communications tools as well that can assist in gaining
purchasing managers’ trust to participate in electronic purchasing consortia.
Few EPC providers among e-Marketplaces offer consulting services to
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establish whether or not purchasing organisations would be generally
willing to participate in EPC and to institute a certain level of trust between
potential consortia members. The findings also suggest that PSPs, after
having established an agreement to EPC, strongly support electronic
implementation of RFx processes, e.g. reverse auctions. This is one of the
reasons why the authors have set up the definition of EPC in such a way that
the level of virtualisation may vary from case to case. Other non-electronic
communications might be necessary as well.
None of the industry consortia-led exchanges currently offer any
electronic purchasing consortia. This appears worth noting because they
would already have finished decisive phases of EPC such as finding
partners, building up trust among the members and getting agreements in
place. This finding confirms the case studies that industry consortia-led
exchanges are typically set up by the major industry players and therefore
demand aggregation might not be able to proceed due to anti-trust
limitations. 60% of electronic purchasing consortia providers have requested
legal approval before implementing EPC. The average number of
competitors against non-competitors in the consortium is approx. 25%. This
finding confirms that anti-trust is a major consideration to electronic
purchasing consortia and that is why electronic purchasing consortia to date
are mostly built by e-Marketplaces and PSPs for multi-sectoral consortia.
Overall, e-Marketplaces / PSPs specified that there would be an increase
of take-up of electronic purchasing consortia from 44% to 61% and an
increase in the offering of reverse auctions from 63% to 79% in the future
(defined as next five years). Moreover, e-Marketplaces / PSPs indicated a
rise in the service provision of the combination EPC and reverse auctions
from 28% presently to 56% in future. This future growth clearly stresses the
awareness of both electronic purchasing consortia and reverse auctions to eMarketplaces and PSPs. In particularly, e-Marketplaces seem to have
realised the potential of EPC and reverse auctions and try to add this
functionality in future. E-Marketplaces and PSPs that have implemented
electronic purchasing consortia and reverse auctions regard them as an
essential part of their functionality and business strategy. However, EPC
providers also specified that EPC and reverse auctions are just one element
of their overall service provision and support them with more functionality
and customised services such as legacy system integration, tracking and
tracing, collaborative engineering, among others. The majority of eMarketplaces and PSPs seem to have realised the potential of more value
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adding services and generally plan to add functionality in future in order to
avoid building one-off, single-sided functions. Overall, EPC providers to
date do not offer more functionality than non-providers.
E-Marketplaces and PSPs cited the lack of firm participation as critical
to its service offerings. Other major drawbacks specified for electronic
purchasing consortia are potential anti-trust issues and that company secrets
are perceived by purchasing managers not to be kept confidential to
competitors. Firms that collaborate, even with non-competitors, may fear
that firms may be directly or indirectly provided with sensitive competitive
information (Hendrick, 1997). A high degree of trust among all participants
and a strong management support are considered as vital factors for
electronic purchasing consortia.
For suppliers, drawbacks cited mainly include that the increased
transparency in EPC can result in lower margins and more pressure from
purchasing organisations. That is why strong suppliers, especially of
strategic items, may resist participating in EPC. Hendrick (1997) explains
that by keeping the members of an EPC as separate customers, they can
extract higher margins that could be negotiated by the group. While
collaboration with suppliers and other companies is perceived by 95% of all
e-Marketplaces and PSPs as it is getting more important in the future, eMarketplaces / PSPs predominantly offer EPC solutions that focus on a
rather transactional, arm’s length buyer-supplier relationship. EMarketplaces and PSPs acknowledged supplier benefits such as a quick
access to large pools of buyers with lower sales costs and long-term
business volume. Overall, EPC providers estimate the benefits of EPC on a
higher scale and the drawbacks on a lower scale than non-providers. Having
put EPC in practice, it seems that benefits can outweigh the drawbacks.
Another factor to be taken into consideration is the product pooling
potential: E-Marketplaces and PSPs generally estimate that 32% of their
products could be pooled. Providers of EPC specify an average present
product pooling of about 15% and acknowledge that there is still some
potential to increase their average present pooling of products. In terms of
revenue models, providers of both electronic purchasing and reverse
auctions do not charge solely suppliers at all. 50% of EPC providers charge
only buyers; the other half charges both suppliers and buyers. Hendrick
(1997) found that purchasing consortia have in most cases no direct fees and
each member contributes expense coverage, time and effort about equally.
The survey confirmed the case study findings that for EPC, there seems to

16

some shift to a mixture of revenue models such as the payment of expenses
based on a percentage of purchases, fixed monthly / yearly revenues or fees
paid as a percentage of cost savings. One explanation for this finding can be
that for example the fees paid as a percentage of cost savings can have more
immediate benefits and ROI for purchasing organisations. Less financial
risk can be involved and outsourcing can take precedence.
In terms of tangible benefits, providers of electronic purchasing
consortia specify an average saving in purchasing costs of 12.4% with
demand aggregation. With EPC, member companies have to invest an
average of 7.0% of purchasing costs for setting-up and managing the
electronic purchasing consortium. As a result, an average net saving of 5.4%
and a ROI of 77% can be calculated for companies that participate in EPC.
For reverse auctions, a higher ROI results: The average savings (in % of
purchasing costs) for buyers in reverse auctions were 16.1%. The average
buyer investment for reverse auctions (in % of purchasing costs) was 4.6%.
The result is a net saving of 11.6% and a ROI of 254%. However, there
usually is a cut off point or minimum amount to order to conduct a reverse
auction effectively. Providers of reverse auctions specify that there should
be an average minimum amount of 51,000 euros of a specific product
demand to run a profitable reverse auction. This finding reveals that
electronic demand bundling can well be a prerequisite for smaller
purchasing organisations to obtain the required purchase volume for a
profitable reverse auction. Providers of both EPC and reverse auctions claim
to achieve average savings (in % of purchasing costs) of 28.5% by the
combination of EPC and reverse auctions. The average investment (in % of
purchasing costs) for both EPC and reverse auctions is 11.1%.
Consequently, an average net saving of 17.4% and a ROI of 155% results by
the combination of both reverse auctions and electronic purchasing
consortia. Obviously, this tandem can achieve significant net savings and
ROI. There was no statistical evidence that the more customised services are
offered by e-Marketplaces / PSPs, the higher the general net savings in
purchasing costs achieved. Presently, providers of EPC and reverse auctions
seem to be quite satisfied and positive about electronic purchasing consortia
and reverse auctions. Figure 4 summarises the key survey findings.
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Figure 4
•
•
•
•
•
•

Key Survey Findings

EPC offered by 27% of e-Marketplaces and by 82% of procurement service
providers.
Future EPC adoption among e-Marketplaces / PSPs will increase.
Anti-trust limitations require legal approval, in particular for consortium-led
e-Marketplaces.
E-Marketplaces / PSPs try to add customised services to avoid building
single-sided functions.
Average economies of scale and scope exceed EPC transaction and
communication costs.
A mixture of funding options for EPC is provided by e-Marketplaces / PSPs.

6. Discussion of Findings
All in all the results demonstrate that, despite some scepticism and
drawbacks, electronic purchasing consortia, it is perceived, will become
more important in the future. The overall consensus is positive. New
electronic metamediaries such as e-Marketplaces and procurement service
providers have the potential to interpose themselves between suppliers and
buyers by taking advantage of new types of economies of scale, scope and
knowledge, enabled by ICT, in particular the Internet.
However, the analysis of EPC process structures and drivers among eMarketplaces / PSPs also reveals that major barriers exist to adoption: For
example, legal limitations can evolve, which are, according to the trade
commissions, amenable to traditional anti-trust analysis. The further EPC
extend beyond the ‘safe harbour’, which under EU guidelines is fixed at
15%, the greater the risk of a negative competitive effect. In the US, if less
than 20 percent of a market is affected by an exclusive arrangement, the
practice will likely avoid regulatory scrutiny because it falls within the
antitrust safety zone. Anti-trust limitations can be one of the reasons why
EPC are offered less in the automotive industry (39%) than in the
electronics industry (65%).
What differentiates the electronics industry from the automotive is
higher volatile demand, more rapid inventory depreciation and a more
dynamic character. The electronics industry is not as vertically integrated
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and concentrated as the automotive industry, which makes it a better
candidate for EPC models. Potential anti-trust limitations are more likely to
arise in the oligopsonistic automotive industry. For example, the consortialed e-Marketplace Covisint specifies on its website: “First, Covisint will not
aggregate the purchases of one OEM with those of another OEM. Second,
Covisint will not offer aggregated purchasing services for any automotivespecific parts or materials. Third, Covisint's future aggregated purchases of
non-automotive specific parts (such as office supplies, cleaning supplies,
etc.) will always be within the applicable competitive law guidelines in the
market in which the purchases are made.”
By forming EPC within Covisint, several OEMs would dominate the
automotive purchasing share world-wide. Due to regulatory issues consortia
of automotive manufacturers will not be allowed to pool their demand for
production parts. Nonetheless, Covisint has taken a very conservative
approach: Demand aggregation between OEMs and tier 1 suppliers (for e.g.
raw materials) which is common practice in the automotive industry was
also not integrated. EPC providers have to establish means by which the
risks of collusion of anti-trust can be ameliorated, e.g. by erecting firewalls
to prevent access by competitors to certain information, by implementing
the use of nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements or by restricting EPC
membership when members’ purchasing volumes approach 15% of the
respective product market. In this respect, the ongoing dialogue between
trade commissions, e-Marketplaces / PSPs and purchasing organisations is a
prerequisite to fully take advantage of EPC potentials.
E-Marketplaces / PSPs also cited further challenges to EPC such as a not
adequate training and education of purchasing managers in EPC, a low
degree of information on change management and, rather self-critically, a
lack of maturity in service offerings. E-Marketplaces and PSPs realised that
they have to add services and functionality in future. Currently available
EPC solutions are still some way from covering the entire spectrum of
procurement requirements. It was also found that e-Procurement of complex
modules with high asset specificity are more difficult to proceed by EPC
because the parts are rarely sourced entirely on the basis of price, but on
concept competition, supplier capabilities and in most cases single sourcing.
Lapidus (2000) assumes that only 20% of sales in the automotive industry
are commodity purchases, which would be more suitable for EPC due to
their lower asset specificity. Some conflict with electronic purchasing
consortia was identified in the concentrated auto industry, with its module
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structure, fierce competition and overcapacity and therefore take-up of EPC
among e-Marketplaces / PSPs in this industry is relatively low.
Effective participation in electronic purchasing consortia has the
potential to enhance competitive advantage in the automotive industry, but
this potential is limited due to e.g. the concentration of the sector (legal
issues), cultural impediments and technical factors (modularised assembly).
More horizontal integrated and fragmented industry sectors such as the
electronics industry are better suited to adopt EPC. Moreover, the
electronics industry with its high-velocity product cycles and swings in
demand have aggressively embraced outsourcing, contract manufacturing
and reintermediation, which may contribute to the higher level of EPC
implementation. However, e-Marketplaces / PSPs further specified that
many purchasing organisations have not yet evolved to the stage where they
are joining e-Marketplaces / PSPs in any significant numbers. They will
have to overcome this fundamental hurdle before strategic sourcing teams
are joining EPC and applying strategic leverage on the supply base.

7. Conclusion
As firms are increasingly adopting ICT in their supply chain operations,
the need to empirically research EPC was identified. Although it was
demonstrated that EPC may add to competitive advantage and result in an
average positive return on investment, sophisticated employment and
diffusion of electronic purchasing consortia is still very much at a
developmental stage in industry. From the research, it is apparent that EPC,
despite limitations, can be a valuable strategic tool worth consideration
inside an integrated supply chain model.
While dependant on industry sector characteristics, the model of
electronic purchasing consortia can represent a strategic procurement
direction for the future and is developing in an evolutionary rather than in a
revolutionary manner. The findings and the developed framework represent
a starting point for further EPC theory development and indicate that EPC is
a rich, multi-faceted domain. However, much work still needs to be carried
out if the use of this type of electronic network is to be more widely adopted
in industrial firms. Electronic purchasing consortia are still in their infancy
and research is still in conceptual and theoretical flux.
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